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Abstract 
This paper provides a case-study analysis that allows the 
highlighting of any inconsistencies or unequal treatment in 
adjudication procedures in tax matters, a sector particularly 
interesting and fruitful for an investigation concerning the tricky 
balance between the requirements of taxation and the protection 
of the freedoms and rights of the individual. First of all, tax is not 
a subject of harmonisation, so the procedural autonomy of the 
states is even more marked insofar as it is grafted on to a 
standardisation that varies greatly between the various states. 
Moreover, in this case European law interfaces with a traditional 
sort of administration rather than with a national regulatory 
authority. The methodology used is inductive, starting from an 
empirical analysis which considers both normative data, and a 
number of important and recent judgments of the Court of Justice, 
selected using the criterion of the invoked applicability of the right 
to be heard in disputes in tax matters. Both national proceedings 
in implementation of EU law, and composite proceedings in 
which tax administrations from various Member States intervene 
are included, in order to highlight any discrepancies related to the 
type of proceedings adopted. 
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1. Introduction1 
Chief Justice John Marshall said it very clear in the famous 
Supreme Court case, McCulloch v. Maryland: “The power to tax 
involves the power to destroy”2. When the government exercises 
its power to tax3, it is crucial that it may be limited by some 
constitutional restraint. One of the most important restraint in 
fiscal adjudication procedures is the respect of the due process of 
law.  
This study is aimed at developing a case study analysis that 
allows the highlighting of any inconsistencies or unequal 
treatment in adjudication procedures in tax matters. 
  
1 This article is a re-elaborated version of a research carried out with the finan-
cial contribution of the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research, 
PRIN Project 2012 (2012SAM3KM). 
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 327 (1819). 
3 On the power to tax, G. Brennan & J.M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytic 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (1980), in which the Authors suggest a new 
paradigm of how governments do behave, considering the power to tax from 
the perspective of the taxpayers.  
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This sector, often overlooked by scholars of public law, 
instead appears to be particularly interesting and fruitful, since it 
has always represented a field of choice for the tricky balance 
between the requirements of taxation and the protection of the 
freedoms and rights of the individual4. 
First of all, tax is not a subject of harmonisation, so the 
procedural autonomy5 of the states is even more marked insofar 
as it is grafted on to a standardisation that varies greatly between 
the various states. 
Moreover, in this case European law interfaces with a 
traditional sort of administration rather than with a national 
regulatory authority. 
The methodology selected is inductive, therefore the study 
will start from an empirical analysis, which will not be limited to a 
survey of the normative data, but will take into consideration a 
number of important and recent judgments of the Court of Justice. 
The selective criterion used to identify the relevant cases 
was that of the invoked applicability of the right to be heard in 
disputes in tax matters. 
With respect to the type of proceedings being investigated, 
it was decided to include both national proceedings in 
implementation of EU law, and composite proceedings in which 
tax administrations from various Member States intervene, in 
order to highlight any discrepancies related to the type of 
proceedings adopted. 
This phenomenological analysis will allow us to delineate 
the concrete explication of one of the most important institutions   
4 As recently affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights, “tax matters 
still form part of the hard core of public-authority prerogatives, with the public 
nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the community remaining 
predominant”, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 12 July 
2001, Ferrazzini vs. Italy, appeal no. 44759/98, para. 29. Furthermore, it is known 
that the Court over time has shown a degree of reluctance to enforce Article 6 of 
the ECHR in the tax area. P. Craig defined as “complex and unsatisfactory” the 
criteria developed by the Court to establish the applicability of Article 6 of the 
ECHR, in the essay The Human Rights Act, Article 6 and Procedural Rights, in 
Public Law, 2003, 753, the quotation is from p. 754. On the applicability of 
Article 6 of the ECHR to administrative proceedings, see M. Allena, Art. 6 
CEDU. Procedimento e processo amministrativo (2012). 
5 On procedural autonomy of member States see D.U. Galetta, L’autonomia pro-
cedurale degli stati membri dell'Unione Europea: Paradise Lost? (2009). 
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for the protection of individuals, namely the right to a hearing, in 
tax matters. 
 
 
2. Empirical analysis 
2.1. National procedures for the implementation of 
European Union law 
2.1.1. The Sopropè judgment and its (partial) transposition 
at national level 
The Sopropè company imports footwear from the Far East. 
By virtue of the generalised system of preferences provided for by 
European legislation, goods from some countries are subject to 
lower customs duties. In the early 2000s, Sopropè was involved in 
52 operations importing footwear, declaring that they were from 
Cambodia, a country that benefits from the preferential customs 
treatment. Subsequently, the anti-fraud services of the Portuguese 
customs authorities (as part of an administrative cooperation 
mission initiated by the European Anti-Fraud Office – OLAF) 
launched an investigation to verify the true source of the 
merchandise. At the end of the control procedure, the customs 
authority formed the view that the certificates of origin were 
falsified, and therefore the footwear should not have benefited 
from the preferential rates. 
The administration informed Sopropè of its intention to 
issue a post-dated recovery measure for the duty, giving the 
company an eight-day deadline to present its point of view. The 
company exercised its right, but the authority considered that the 
documentation produced was not persuasive, and, five days later, 
issued the recovery measure for the customs duties. 
Sopropè appealed against this act both in the first instance 
(where it was unsuccessful) and at appeal, during which the 
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo decided to suspend proceedings 
to refer two questions to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on the interpretation of the principle of respect for the 
rights of the defence. 
The rules relevant to the case in question are two, one of 
European origin, the other national. The first is the Community 
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Customs Code then in force6, the second is the general Portuguese 
tax law7. For the purposes of the case under consideration, it 
should be noted that the Community Customs Code in force at the 
time of this case did not provide for any right of participation for 
the individual before a decision was made regarding them. 
The defensive acts of the Italian Republic, intervening in 
trials, are mainly aimed at highlighting that EU legislation for the 
sector does not provide for any right of the taxpayer to be heard 
during the procedure aimed at establishing the recovery of 
customs duties. 
On the contrary, national law enshrined the right of the 
taxpayer to participate in tax proceedings, regulating in detail the 
procedures for exercising this right. In particular, Article 60 of the 
Portuguese tax law provides for the obligation to notify the 
taxpayer of the “the draft findings in the report” if, at the end of 
the investigation, the tax authority intends to issue an 
unfavourable provision for the taxpayer. This notification has to 
indicate, in addition to the draft order accompanied by the 
reasons, “a period of 8 to 15 days to allow the body which has 
been the subject of the inspection to express its opinion on the 
draft findings” (Article 60, para. 2). 
Sopropè complained about an infringement of its right of 
defence, given that it had only been granted eight days to present 
its observations with regard to as many as 52 import transactions 
which took place over a period of two-and-a-half years. 
Furthermore, the Portuguese tax authorities had issued the 
provision to recover customs duties only five days after receiving 
Sopropè’s observations, a circumstance which led to doubts that 
the administration had adequately considered the observations 
filed. 
With the Sopropè judgment8, the Court of Justice interpreted 
the principle of respecting the rights of defence, providing very 
important clarifications under three distinct profiles.   
6 Reg. (CEE) no. 2913/92 of the Council of 12 October 1992, which establishes a 
Community Customs Code, as amended by Reg. (CE) no. 2700/00 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2000. 
7 The general tax law of Portugal, approved by law by decree no. 398 of 12 
December 1998. 
8 Court of Justice, 18 December 2008, Sopropè, case C-349/07. It is interesting to 
note that the Court decided to define the case without the opinion of the 
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Firstly, the Court of Justice stated that the principle of the 
right to a hearing must be respected whenever the administration 
intends to adopt “a measure which will adversely affect an 
individual”, since respect for the rights of defence constitutes a 
general principle of European Community law (para. 36). On this 
point, the Court declared it was inspired by shared constitutional 
traditions, while it did not recall Article 41 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (at the time of the facts of the case the Charter 
had still not assumed the same legal value as the Treaties, but it 
had already been initialled). 
Secondly, the Court specified that the obligation to hear the 
recipients of decisions lies with the authorities even if EU sectoral 
legislation did not expressly provide for this (para. 38). 
Thirdly, the Court clarified that respect for the rights of 
defence required that the recipient of the provision should be able 
to “effectively” express their point of view, therefore the 
administration must examine with all the necessary attention, the 
observations of the person involved (para. 50). 
The Sopropè judgment was greeted very favourably by 
many commentators, who for some time had been highlighting 
the lack of guarantees to protect the individual in tax 
proceedings9. 
Instead, the innovativeness of this suspension led to a 
different reaction in the national tax court, which was concerned 
with limiting its applicability in order to avoid a general fall in all 
post-dated recovery measures. In fact, in Italian law, there is no 
provision for taxpayers being heard prior to the issue of the 
provision for the recovery of duties. The principle established by 
the Court of Justice in the Sopropè judgment would therefore have 
led to the annulment of all the acts of the national customs   
Advocate General, a circumstance which usually occurs when the judgment is 
part of a consolidated case law of the EUCJ, while the Sopropè judgment is 
decidedly innovative. 
9 By way of example, cf. M. Gambardella, D. Rovetta, Principi generali del diritto 
comunitario, diritto di difesa e obbligazione doganale:cosa cambia nell’ordinamento 
nazionale in seguito alla sentenza della corte di Giustizia nel caso C-349/07, in Dir. 
Prat. Trib., 4/2009 783; S. Marchese, Diritti fondamentali europei e diritto tributario 
dopo il Trattato di Lisbona, in Dir. Prat. Trib., 1/2012 241; Id., Attività istruttorie 
dell’amministrazione finanziaria e diritti fondamentali europei dei contribuenti, in Dir. 
prat. trib., 3/2013 493; A. Marcheselli, Indefettibilità del contraddittorio in ogni 
accertamento tributario, in Corr. Trib., 30/2012 2315. 
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authorities, with obvious repercussions on the Community 
budget. 
To avoid this, the Court of Cassation 10  stated that the 
principles of the Sopropè judgment cannot be applied to 
previously issued acts, thus excluding retroactive applicability. 
This decision, which constitutes an exception to the general 
retroactive applicability of the judgments of the Court of Justice11, 
was justified by pointing out that “the principle stated by the 
Court concerns a procedural formality whose generalised 
compliance was not required by the practices of the European 
Commission”. The Supreme Court also recalls the protection of 
the custody of the customs authorities and European financial 
needs12.  
Therefore, at national level, the court of last instance 
considers that an interpretive ruling by the Court of Justice 
respecting the rights to a defence is not applicable retroactively. 
To justify this limitation of the scope of a decision by the European 
court, the national court refers to the need to protect a 
fundamental resource of the Community budget. In this way, the 
  
10 Cass., sez. trib., 9 April 2010, no. 8481. 
11 This decision of the Court of Cassation causes a degree of perplexity, as the 
temporal delimitation of the effects of judgments of the Court of Justice can be 
established only by the Court of Justice itself. Moreover, this temporal 
circumscription of the effects cannot contrast with the fundamental principle of 
judicial protection established by Article 24 of the Constitution, as can be seen 
from the judgment no. 232 of the Const. Court of 1989, regarding which cf. V. 
Angiolini, N. Marzona, Diritto comunitario diritto interno: effetti costituzionali e 
amministrativi, (1990), spec. 32 ff. The binding nature of the interpretive 
judgments of the Court of Justice has been recognised by the Constitutional 
Court since 1985, with judgment no. 113. On the evolution of constitutional and 
EU case law as well as on their relationship, we limit ourselves to referring to F. 
Sorrentino, Profili costituzionali dell’integrazione comunitaria (1996). 
12  “Considering that the application of the principle to the proceedings 
underway would result in a general annulment of any customs decision 
unfavourable to the importer, with very severe repercussions on a fundamental 
resource of the Community budget, this Court considers that the preference 
(not necessarily determined by an active behaviour on the part of Community 
organs) of the national customs authorities for a Community practice that did 
not consider it necessary to ensure the right to a hearing in the administrative 
phase, cannot result, for customs decisions taken before the Sopropè ruling, in 
the invalidity of such acts”. Cass., Sez. trib., 9 April 2010, no. 8481. 
FERRARI ZUMBINI – THE POWER TO TAX WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 
126 
 
administrative authorities prefer a previous Community practice 
to the protection of the right to a hearing. 
 
2.1.2. The legitimacy of postponing the right to a hearing 
to a subsequent phase of the claim, the Kamino judgment  
It is not only the national court that reshapes the 
applicability of the rights of defence as set out in the Sopropè 
judgment. The same Court of Justice does so in a subsequent 
decision again related to the post-dated recovery of customs 
duties. 
In the ruling issued on 3 July 2014 in the combined cases C-
129/13 (Kamino) and C-130/13 (Datema), the European court took 
significant steps backwards, legitimising national laws that 
provide for the right to a hearing only in a subsequent phase of 
the process against the provision of the customs authority13. 
The two companies are customs agents who imported 
goods described as “garden pavilions/party tents”, applying the 
rate of 4.7% for “garden umbrellas”. Two years after the import 
operations, the Dutch customs authorities maintained that the 
goods in question should be classified as “tents and camping 
goods” for which the rate is 12.2%, and then requesting the 
recovery of the duties. Neither company was heard prior to the 
issuing of orders for payment 
Both companies challenged the measure complaining about 
the lack of opportunity to usefully express their point of view 
before a damaging act was adopted against them, being 
unsuccessful both in the administrative complaint, and in the first 
two degrees of proceedings before the Dutch courts. During the 
Cassation hearing, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden made a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, recalling the 
principle of the respect for the right to a hearing expressed in the 
Sopropè judgment. 
The relevant European law for the case is again the customs 
code in force until October 2013 14 . This establishes that the   
13 On the difference between a pre-deprivation hearing and a post-deprivation 
hearing, highlighting that the temporal factor is crucial for preventing the harm, 
R.M. Lipton, Procedural Due Process in Tax Collection: An Opportunity for a Prompt 
Postdeprivation Hearing, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 594 1976-1977.  
14 The new Customs Code of the Union, established by Reg. (EU) no. 952/2013, 
of the European Parliament and Council, of 9 October 2013, instead provides for 
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calculation of the duties to be recovered must take place within 
two days from the moment in which the customs authority 
realises that it is necessary to recalculate the amount (Article 220, 
para. 1, of the Customs Code). This decision must then be 
communicated to the debtor. It has already been pointed out that 
the European legislation previously in force provided no 
obligation for the customs authority to hear the recipient before 
issuing the recovery measure. Moreover, as clearly stated by 
Advocate General Wathelet, “That mandatory time-limit of two 
days is difficult to reconcile with the obligation to hear the 
interested party prior to the decision to enter the amount of duty 
to be recovered in the accounts”15. 
The Dutch law on administrative procedure16 affirms the 
right to be heard before a potentially injurious provision is 
enacted (Article 4.8). However, in proceedings aimed at 
constituting an obligation of a financial nature, the right to a 
hearing may be disregarded, provided that the final order can be 
re-examined at administrative level – during which the person 
concerned has to be heard – in such a way as to allow for the 
complete elimination of the negative consequences of the act 
(Article 4.12).  
Furthermore, in a way that is partially similar to what is 
foreseen in Italian law, the administrative authority at the time of 
the complaint can confirm a decision taken in violation of a rule or 
  
the right to be heard. Recital 27 states “In accordance with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it is necessary to provide, in 
addition to the right to appeal against the decisions taken by the customs 
authorities, the right of every person to be heard before a decision is taken 
which could harm them”. As a consequence, Article 22, para. 6 of the Code 
states that “Before making a decision that has unfavourable consequences for 
the applicant, the customs authorities shall communicate the reasons on which 
they intend to base the decision to the applicant, who is given the opportunity 
to express their point of view within a given term from the date on which the 
applicant receives the communication or is deemed to have received it”. This 
article applies only to decisions taken on request. 
15  Para. 52 of the Conclusions presented by Advocate General Melchior 
Wathelet on 25 February 2014 in the united cases C 129/13 and C 130/13, 
Kamino International Logistics BV (C 129/13), and Datema Hellmann 
Worldwide Logistics BV (C 130/13) against Staatssecretaris van Financiën. 
16 The Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht, of 4 June 1992. 
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general principle if this violation did not cause harm to the 
interested parties (Article 6.22). 
Therefore, in this case, neither European law nor national 
law provide for the right of the interested party to be heard before 
a provision for the recovery of customs duties is issued against 
them. 
Furthermore, since the measures in question date back to 
2005, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which only came into 
force in 2009, does not apply. 
The Court of Justice, after recalling that respect for the 
rights of defence is a fundamental principle of EU law, of which 
the right to be heard in any proceedings is an integral part17, 
comes to a conclusion that seems to contradict the principle just 
stated. 
The reasoning followed by the Court is based on the 
observation that fundamental rights – and among these the 
respect for the rights of defence – are not “unfettered 
prerogatives” (para. 42 of the decision), but may be subject to 
restrictions.  
Such restrictions may be justified on condition that they 
pass a double test of legitimacy: on the one hand, they must 
pursue objectives of general interest; on the other, they must be 
proportionate. 
Given this conceptual starting point, the Court of Justice 
intends to verify whether, in the cases submitted to its 
examination, the limitation of the rights to defence is justifiable. 
So, in the premises to this analysis of justification, the Court 
betrays a partial approach, when it defines the functional profile 
of the right to be heard. Indeed, in illustrating the scope of the 
right to a hearing, the Court emphasises only its collaborative 
connotation (“to enable the competent authority effectively to take 
into account all relevant information”, para. 38), overlooking the 
truly defensive and participatory-democratic components. 
The effect of this imposition reverberates in the subsequent 
implementation of the double test of legitimacy performed on the 
limitations to the right to be heard.   
17 Para. 28 of the Kamino judgment, recalling the Sopropè ruling on tax matters 
and the M. M. vs. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform judgment of 22 
November 2012, case C-277/11 concerning the recognition of refugee status. 
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With regard to the general-interest objectives that have to 
be pursued, the Court places them in the general interest of 
administrative simplification, which in this case is expressed in the 
interest of the European Union “in recovering its own revenue as 
soon as possible” (para. 54). On this point, curiously, the Court of 
Justice refers to the Sopropè judgment, even using the same words, 
to affirm that this general interest of the Union demands that the 
controls be carried out promptly. However, it seems appropriate 
to point out that in the Sopropè judgment this statement was made 
to justify the provision of a short term (between 8 and 15 days) for 
the taxpayer’s exercise of their right to be heard. In this case, the 
legislation does not provide the right to a hearing at all, 
postponing it to some point after the act is issued. The Court, 
therefore, uses the same argument to justify two very different (if 
not opposed) situations: the interest in promptly recovering 
revenue is used the first time to justify a short deadline for the 
exercise of the rights of defence, reaffirmed in their existence, 
while the second time the Court of Justice uses the same argument 
to legitimise the lack of provision of a prior hearing. 
With respect to the proportionality of the limitation, the 
Court considers that the deferment of the hearing to the complaint 
stage may be a proportionate measure to the interest of speeding 
up procedures, provided certain conditions are met. On this point, 
the Court refers to a previous judgment 18  with which it had 
deemed legitimate the imposition of a penalty in the absence of 
the right to a hearing because the filing of the appeal against the 
provision made it immediately unenforceable, initiating a process 
in which the recipient could fully express their right to be heard. 
Therefore, the immediate automatic suspension of the provision 
satisfactorily protected the interest of the taxpayer, who was 
allowed to express their position during the complaint phase. 
In the wake of this case law, in the present case the 
European judge takes a further step towards the restrictions on 
due process in tax matters. In fact, in the Kamino judgment it is 
specified that in order for the deferment of the hearing to the 
complaint phase to be considered proportionate – and therefore 
legitimate – it is not necessary for the filing of the claim to have 
the effect of automatically suspending the act. It is sufficient – as   
18 Court of Justice, 26 September 2013, Texdata Software, case C-418/11. 
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in the case of Article 244, para. 2 of the Customs Code – that 
suspension might be granted when there are reasonable grounds 
for doubting whether the act conforms with the law or there is a 
risk of irreparable damage to the interested party.  
Therefore, according to the Court of Justice, a subsequent 
hearing, in the context of an administrative appeal, is suitable to 
guarantee the right to be heard, provided that it is possible to 
suspend the execution of the provision, even if such a suspension 
is not automatic, but subject to certain conditions. 
In the Kamino judgment, the right to a hearing is limited not 
only in its content (since it is not necessary that the right to a 
hearing  takes place prior to the issuing of the act, a hearing being 
sufficient in the subsequent second-degree proceedings) but also 
in the effects connected to its possible violation. According to the 
Court of Justice a violation of the principle of respect for the rights 
of the defence involves the annulment of the decision in question 
only when, without such an infringement, the proceedings could 
have led to a different outcome (para. 80). Therefore, the failure to 
comply with a fundamental right, such as being heard before an 
offending act is adopted against them, entails the annulment of 
the act only if the proceedings could have had a different outcome 
if the interested party had been heard. 
 
2.1.3. Limitations on the rights exercisable in the hearing, 
the Unitrading judgment  
Shortly after the Kamino judgment, the Court of Justice 
again opined on the matter of the right to a hearing in proceedings 
for the recovery of customs duties, limiting the rights exercisable 
by the participants. The case arises from a dispute about the 
country of origin of the goods (as in the Sopropè judgment) in 
which the customs authority began the debate with the recipient 
of the provision. The latter, however, complained of a significant 
limitation of the rights that it could exercise during the procedural 
investigation. 
The Unitrading company had released in free circulation a 
batch of fresh garlic heads, declaring they came from Pakistan, 
thus benefiting from a preferential rate. The Dutch customs 
authorities took a number of samples, and had them analysed by 
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the laboratory of the American customs authorities 19 , who 
affirmed that it was actually Chinese garlic (to which a higher rate 
should apply).  
Unitrading – in this case invited to participate in the 
proceedings – had presented three requests to the administration: 
to repeat the analysis at the American laboratory, to know the 
details and methodology of the analysis carried out by the 
American laboratory, and to have the samples examined at their 
own expense by another laboratory. Only the first of these three 
requests was granted. The American laboratory confirmed its 
analysis, refusing to provide any information about the operations 
they carried out. On the basis of this result, the authority issued a 
payment notice that Unitrading challenged both during the 
complaint and in court, after which the Dutch Court of Cassation 
made preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. 
This case highlighted the rights exercisable by the 
interested parties during the procedure aimed at establishing the 
real origin of the goods placed on the market. Unitrading, 
although invited to participate, objected that it was unable to 
defend its point of view. Indeed, the customs authority based its 
measure solely on the result of the analyses carried out by the 
American laboratory, which refused to provide any information 
about the examinations carried out. This confidentiality was 
justified on grounds of national security, since it was “law 
enforcement sensitive information”. 
Thus, the applicant (as well as the customs authority itself 
that issued the act) knew nothing about the means and procedures 
adopted to establish the origin of the merchandise. This lack of 
information made it impossible to challenge the examination and, 
therefore, its result. Furthermore, the Dutch Government had 
denied Unitrading the possibility of having the remaining samples 
held by the administration examined at their own expense.  
The Court of Justice stated that proof of the origin of 
imported goods can be based “on the results of an examination 
carried out by a third party, with regard to which that third party 
refuses to disclose further information [...], as a result of which it is 
made difficult or impossible to verify or disprove the correctness of the   
19 The laboratory of the US Department of Homeland Security, Customs and 
Border Protection. 
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conclusions reached, provided that the principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence are upheld”20.  
Furthermore, in accordance with the procedural autonomy 
of the Member States, the existence of the right of the interested 
party to carry out analyses at their own expense must be assessed 
solely on the basis of national law. 
According to the European court, therefore, where the 
customs authority establishes the adversarial relationship with the 
taxpayer in proceedings for the post-dated recovery of customs 
duties resulting from a different country of origin being stated, 
European Union law and the protection of fundamental rights do 
not prevent, in principle, the proof of origin being based on 
analyses made by a third party whose accuracy cannot be verified 
or refuted (para. 32). 
 
2.2. Composite proceedings, the Sabou judgment 
Moving the point of view from national proceedings in 
implementation of EU law to composite proceedings21 involving 
tax administrations from different Member States, taxpayers’ 
rights certainly do not enjoy greater protection. In fact, with a 
recent ruling of the Grand Chamber aimed at interpreting the 
legislation on cross-border cooperation between the financial 
administrations of Member States, the Court of Justice stated that 
there was no obligation to inform the taxpayer or to invite the 
taxpayer to participate in the witness hearing22. 
The decision originates from the appeal by Mr Sabou 
against an assessment notice issued by the Prague tax office. Mr 
Sabou is a professional footballer who in his tax declaration for the 
year 2004 had deducted substantial expenses incurred in various 
European countries. These expenses were incurred during 
negotiations with a view to his transfer to a number of foreign 
clubs.    
20 Court of Justice, 23 October 2014, Unitrading Ltd, case C-437/13, para. 30, 
emphasis added. 
21  For a comprehensive analysis of models (and problems) of composite 
procedures, see G. della Cananea, The European Union’s Mixed Administrative 
Proceedings, 68 Law & Contemp. Probl. 197 2004. 
22 Court of Justice, 22 October 2013, Sabou, case C-276/12. It seems interesting to 
note that the Commission challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to judge this case, 
as is apparent from the judgment reaffirming its jurisdiction. 
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The financial administration of the Czech Republic, 
doubting the veracity of these expenses, requested information 
from the tax authorities of the countries where the costs had been 
incurred (Spain, France, the United Kingdom and Hungary). In 
particular, the Czech Treasury asked their Spanish, French and 
British counterparts to contact the football clubs mentioned by Mr 
Sabou to ask them for confirmation of the negotiations, and they 
asked the Hungarian Treasury asked to verify the accounting of 
the company Solomon Group Kft for the invoices presented in 
connection with their brokerage activities with the foreign clubs. 
The tax administrations replied that from their checks the 
foreign football clubs were unaware of the existence of Mr Sabou, 
and the Hungarian company was simply an intermediary for 
services provided by Solomon International Ltd. based in the 
Bahamas. On the basis of this information, the Czech authorities 
issue a notice of assessment that Mr Sabou opposed up to the 
Supreme Administrative Court, which made a preliminary 
reference to the Court of Justice. 
The appellant complained of the infringement of his right to 
defence in multiple respects. Firstly, the Treasury had not 
informed him that it had requested the assistance of the foreign 
tax administrations, not allowing him to participate in the 
formulation of the inquiries. Secondly, he was not able to attend 
the witness hearings in the other states. Finally, from the answers 
provided, it was not possible to infer how the foreign 
administrations obtained their information 23 , thus making it 
impossible for the taxpayer to challenge its accuracy. 
Also in this case there are two relevant rules, one European, 
the other national. 
The first is Directive 77/799/EEC on mutual assistance 
between the authorities of Member States in the field of direct 
taxation, which governs the exchange of information between tax 
administrations in order to allow proper a determination of 
income taxes. The directive deals with the relationship between 
the tax administrations of the Member States, establishing mutual 
  
23 Some administrations indicated the names of the people from whom the 
information had been requested, others referred generically to the football club. 
Furthermore, the methods for acquiring the information were not disclosed, 
whether by telephone, IT means or at a hearing. 
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obligations, while it does not deal with the relationship between 
taxpayers and administrations, therefore it does not attribute any 
rights to the interested parties.  
The Czech legislation concerning the administration of 
taxes, in terms of its relevance here, grants for the taxpayer subject 
to tax assessment the right to question witnesses and experts 
during the hearing24.  
The Court substantially had to answer the question about 
whether or not the taxpayer has the right to be heard during the 
process of acquiring information from foreign tax authorities. 
The Court considered three distinct sources of European 
law that could (abstractly) attribute such a right in this case, but 
came to the conclusion that none of them actually protected it. 
First of all, obviously, Article 41 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights comes to the fore, the applicability of which 
is excluded for reasons of time, since the assessment notice was 
issued in May 2009 (para. 25 of the Sabou judgment). 
Secondly, the Court examines the secondary legislation, or 
the European sector norms, to ascertain whether this attributes 
rights to taxpayers. Here too the answer is negative, since 
Directive 77/799/EEC regulates the exchange of information and 
the reciprocal obligations between the tax authorities of the States, 
and does not confer any rights on the interested parties (para. 36). 
The third and last attempt to find a procedural right for the 
taxpayer is to have it descend from the principle of the protection 
of the rights of defence, thus making use of the general principles. 
The Court recalls its own case law formed in the matter of 
composite proceedings, according to which the right to be heard 
constitutes a fundamental right25. However, the Court of Justice 
reiterates that this principle applies only to decisions by 
authorities that may have a negative impact on recipients 26 .   
24 Article 16, para. 4, lett. e) of Zákon č. 337/1992 Sb., o správě daní a poplatků. 
25 This refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 October 1996, Lisrestal, 
case C-32/95, on which we limit ourselves to referring to G. della Cananea (ed.), 
Diritto amministrativo europeo. Principi e istituti (2011) esp. 238 ff. 
26  This delimitation of the right to a hearing in tax matters reflects the 
orientation of the case law of Court of Justice in matters regarding the right to a 
hearing in general. In fact, the Court of Justice has over time reconstructed the 
right to be heard, limiting it to decisions that are potentially detrimental to the 
interested party. This approach was also accepted during the drafting of the 
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Therefore, the judge wonders whether the decision to request 
information from the treasury of another state constitutes an 
injurious act. On this point, the Court provides a rather apodictic 
reasoning, insofar as it limits itself to recalling the distinction in 
tax matters between the investigation phase – in which 
information is gathered – and the stage in which the right to a 
hearing must be guaranteed – which starts only with the 
rectification proposal.  
From this it follows that the general principle of protection 
of the rights of defence does not apply to the request for 
information from another tax administration, even if the replies 
received form the basis of the assessment notices. Thus, the Court 
decided that EU law does not confer “on a taxpayer of a Member 
State either the right to be informed of a request for assistance 
from that Member State addressed to another Member State [...] or 
the right to take part in formulating the request addressed to the 
requested Member State, or the right to take part in examinations 
of witnesses organised by the requested Member State”. 
 
 
3. Morphology and functioning of the right to a hearing in 
adjudication proceedings in tax matters 
From the phenomenological analysis carried out, it is clear 
that there can be a general agreement on the recognition – 
abstractly – of general principles, such as that of defence. 
However, there may be – and indeed there are – discrepancies in 
the sectoral discipline regarding the rights of the defence as well 
as in their concrete unfolding27.  
In the conclusions of one of the cases examined in this 
paper, Advocate General Kokott argued that “The constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States also have included a 
right to be heard in the context of administrative proceedings only 
  
ReNEUAL Model Code, which provided for the right of all parties to be heard 
“before a decision is taken that has detrimental effects on them”, Article III-23. 
For the text in Italian, cf. G. della Cananea, D.U. Galetta (eds), Codice Reneual del 
procedimento amministrativo dell’Unione europea (2016). 
27 On the point cf. C. Harlow, At risk: National administrative procedure within the 
European Union, in G. della Cananea, C. Franchini (eds), Il diritto che cambia, Liber 
amicorum Mario Pilade Chiti (2016) 31 ff., esp. 34. 
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in isolated cases and only recently”28 . This statement appears 
questionable in its being formulated in such general terms29.  
In the more limited context of a sectoral analysis, such as 
the one carried out here on adjudication procedures in the tax 
area, there have indeed been particularly profound divergences 
both in the normative discipline of the right to a hearing and in its 
interpretive reconstruction by the Court of Justice in the light of 
general principles. 
If administrative law in general presents itself as a two-
faced Janus30, since, on the one hand, it constitutes an instrument 
of control of power, and, on the other, it dictates the coordinates to 
allow the attribution and exercise of power, the authoritative side 
appears to prevail in tax matters. The needs of taxation can in 
some cases justify a different protection of the principle of the 
right to a hearing. However, “in a democratic society, taxation [...] 
is based on the application of legal rules and not on the 
authorities’ discretion”31. 
The analysis carried out in this study has made it possible 
to highlight various inconsistencies and differences in treatment in 
adjudication procedures in the tax field. In particular, the critical 
issues that emerge in a more significant way regard the following 
four profiles.  
 
3.1. Failure to provide the right to a hearing in European 
tax law 
A first critical point is the fact that European regulations 
pertaining to the fiscal sector often do not provide for the right to 
  
28 Opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott delivered on 6 June 2013 in Case 
C-276/12, Sabou, para. 54, which refers to V. Kai-Dieter Classen, Gute 
Verwaltung im Recht der Europäischen Union, (2008). 
29 For a reconstruction of the audi alteram partem principle as a general one of the 
administrative procedure that has deep historical roots, cf. G. della Cananea, 
Due process of law beyond the State (2016) esp. 35 ff. 
30 As stated by M.P. Chiti, administrative procedures have to pursue a dual 
purpose, since they must at the same time “support the pursuit of the public 
interest while seeking to guarantee security for the affected individual”. M. P. 
Chiti, Are there the universal principles of good government?, in Eur. Publ. L. 241 
1/1995. The judgment quoted is on p. 247. 
31 Para. 7 of the dissenting opinion of Judge Lorenzon in the ECHR Ferrazzini 
judgment, cited in note 1. 
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be heard in proceedings, even when they are aimed at issuing 
damaging acts32. 
This gap is found both in regulations governing 
harmonised taxes (such as customs duties) and in directives 
governing administrative cooperation for non-harmonised taxes 
(such as direct taxes). 
With regard to customs duties until just a few years ago, the 
European Customs Code did not provide for any right of the 
interested party to be heard before a damaging act was enacted 
against them33.  
In the area of direct taxation, Directive 77/799/EEC on 
mutual assistance between the tax authorities of Member States 
was concerned with defining the modalities for the exchange of 
information, as well as the mutual obligations of the financial 
administrations, without conferring any right on taxpayers. 
However, it has been seen that the process of requesting 
information can lead to unfavourable consequences for the 
interested party since it constitutes the basis for a possible 
assessment notice. 
The absence of express provisions to protect the right to a 
hearing in proceedings has been dealt with in the area of customs 
duties, but not in cross-border administrative cooperation for the 
exchange of information for the proper determination of direct 
taxes. In fact, in this regard, there has been no impact at all with 
the repeal of Directive 77/799/EEC and its replacement with 
  
32 It might be interesting to consider that defence safeguards were provided 
even during the Age of inquistion, as demonstrated by M. Damaška, The Quest 
for Due Process in the Age of Inquisition, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 919 2012. 
33 As stated above in para. 2.1.1., the previous Customs Code did not provide 
for the right to a hearing before the issue of a post-dated recovery of customs 
duties. The new European Union Customs Code (UCC) approved with Reg. 
(EU) no. 952/2013 provides for the right to be heard, regarding which cf. above, 
note 10. Furthermore, in the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 
2015 of the Commission integrating the UCC, subsection 1 is dedicated to the 
“right to be heard”, in which are established: the deadline within which the 
applicant can express their point of view before a decision is taken which might 
have negative consequences for them, set at 30 days (Article 8), the means for 
communicating the reasons (Article 9) and the exceptions to the right to be 
heard (Article 10). 
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Directive 2011/16/EU currently in force, since this does not grant 
taxpayers any rights either34. 
 
3.2. The (contradictory) case law of the Court of Justice 
and the Court of Cassation 
A second profile of criticality can be found in case law (both 
European and national), which in the tax field reconstructs the 
right to be heard in a way that is not entirely consistent. 
Starting from the case law of the Court of Justice, it can be 
seen, first of all, that some decisions appear partially contradictory 
in affirming the very existence of the right to a hearing. The 
Sopropè and Sabou judgments are two very significant examples. In 
both cases, the European law in question did not provide for the 
right to be heard, while this right was protected by the general tax 
laws of the states concerned. In both cases, for reasons of time, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights could not be applied, therefore it 
was necessary to resort to the application of the general principle 
of protection of the rights of defence. But in the Sopropè judgment, 
the Court affirms the existence of the right to usefully express a 
point of view, whereas in Sabou this right is denied. 
Furthermore, there is a discrepancy about the time when 
the right to a hearing has to be guaranteed. If, in the Sopropè case, 
the right to a hearing must precede the emanation of the 
damaging act, in the Kamino case a subsequent protection is 
considered legitimate, or the postponement of the right to a 
hearing until the complaint phase. 
So too the functional profile of the right to be heard is not 
uniformly defined at European level, since sometimes the Court of 
Justice highlights the collaborative component (“to enable the 
competent authority effectively to take into account all relevant 
information”, para. 38 of the Kamino judgment), overlooking out 
  
34  Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation states in Recital 28 that “This Directive 
respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in 
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. 
However, despite this statement of principle, the directive does not provide for 
any rights for taxpayers, being limited to the regulation of relations between 
financial administrations. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 11     ISSUE 1/2019 
139 
 
the properly defensive component which emerges instead with 
greater clarity in the conclusions of the Advocates General35. 
Finally, with regard to the effects deriving from the 
infringement of the right to a hearing, the CJEU admits that these 
are defined by national law; the useful effect of EU law does not 
require that flawed measures are always annulled. An 
infringement of the rights of the defence would involve the 
annulment of the damaging act only if the appellant proves that 
the act could have had a different content36 (Kamino judgment, 
para 80). 
Also on the national side, the case law of the court of last 
instance appears to be not without contradictions and critical 
issues. 
It has already been pointed out that the Court of Cassation 
first affirmed – in a questionable manner – the non-retroactivity of 
the Sabou judgment with which the Court of Justice recognised the 
general validity of the right to be heard in tax-related matters. 
Subsequently, with various judgments of 2014, the Supreme 
Court recognised the right to be heard as a fundamental principle 
of EU law, which must therefore also be guaranteed in tax matters 
regardless of whether it is expressly provided for by sectoral 
regulation37.  
However, this orientation was partially disregarded only a 
year later. Indeed, with a ruling in 2015 by the Joint Session, the 
Supreme Court ruled that in the Italian legal system there is a   
35 For example, cf. the Opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott presented 
on 6 June 2013 in Case C-276/12, Sabou, para. 55. 
36 The issue of the non-annullability of the measure adopted in violation of the 
rules on the procedure is examined here under the specific profile of the failure 
to provide the right to a hearing on tax matters. For the general terms of the 
question, cf.: V. Parisio (ed), Vizi formali, procedimento e processo amministrativo 
(2004) esp. the essay by F.G. Scoca, I vizi formali, nel sistema delle invalidità dei 
provvedimenti amministrativi, 55; D. Corletto, Vizi formali e poteri del giudice 
amministrativo, in Dir. Proc. Amm. 33 2006; for a comparative framing of the 
issue with German and European law, D.U. Galetta, Violazione di norme sul 
procedimento amministrativo e annullabilità del provvedimento, (2003); for an 
analysis of the current national legislation, also in relation to EU law and Article 
41 of the Charter, P. Provenzano, I vizi nella forma e nel procedimento 
amministrativo. Fra diritto interno e diritto dell’Unione europea (2015), which also 
provides a comparative analysis with German and Spanish law. 
37 Cf. Cass., SS. UU., 18 September 2014, no. 19667 and no. 19668; Cass., Sec. V, 5 
December 2014, no. 25759. 
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general right to a hearing  in tax matters only for harmonised 
taxes, or when the tax administration directly applies EU rules. On 
the contrary, when the administration initiates a proceeding 
aimed at adopting a provision detrimental to the taxpayer’s rights 
under a national rule, there is no general obligation to hear the 
taxpayer – and this non-hearing will result in the nullity of the act 
only if a specific provision explicitly foresees this. This decision of 
the Court of Cassation derives from the observation that in the 
European agreement there is a general right to a hearing also in 
the tax field, the violation of which involves the lapse of the act; 
instead “the national law, with the legislation of today, does not 
give the fiscal administration that is preparing to adopt a 
provision prejudicial to the taxpayer’s rights, in the absence of a 
specific prescription, a general obligation of the right to a hearing 
during proceedings, leading, in case of violation, to the invalidity 
of the act”38. In the national context, therefore, the taxpayer would 
always have the right to be heard before the administration adopts 
an injurious measure in the matter of VAT or customs duties, 
while they would not have the same right – unless the sectoral 
regulation expressly provides for it – concerning IRES 
(corporation tax) or IRAP (regional business tax). This orientation 
of the Supreme Court raises delicate questions with respect to 
  
38 Cass., SS. UU., 9 December 2015, no. 24823. The quoted text is contained in 
the principle of law enunciated by the judgment, which continues: “It follows 
that, in terms of “non-harmonised” taxes, the Administration’s duty to activate 
the right to a hearing within the proceedings, under the penalty of the 
invalidity of the act, exists exclusively in relation to the hypotheses for which 
such an obligation is specifically sanctioned; while in the matter of 
“harmonised” taxes, where the direct application of the law of the European 
Union takes place, the violation of the obligation of the right to a hearing within 
the proceedings on the part of the administration implies in any case, including 
in the tax field, the invalidity of the act, provided that, in judgment, the 
taxpayer expresses concretely the reasons they could have asserted, if the right 
to a hearing had been promptly activated, and which the opposition of said 
reasons (evaluated with reference to the moment of the lack of the right to a 
hearing), prove to be not purely specious and such as to configure, in relation to 
the general rule of fairness and good faith and the principle of a proper trial, a 
misuse of the defensive instrument with respect to the purpose of the proper 
protection of the substantial interest for which it was prepared”. 
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multiple profiles, not least that of compatibility with the 
Constitutional principle of equality39. 
The contradictoriness and confusion are increased by the 
fact that some provincial tax commissions have not shared the 
distinction between harmonised and non-harmonised taxes 
imposed by the judgment of the Joint Session. Therefore, some – 
but not all – Tax Commissions have overcome this orientation and 
recognised the right to be heard before the enactment of an 
imposition act as a general principle applicable to all taxes40.  
 
3.3. Reverse discrimination in national proceedings 
implementing EU law 
National disciplines in the tax field may present differences, 
even profound ones, in many ways41: the right to be heard can be 
expressly protected or not42; the moment in the proceedings where 
this right has to be protected, or if it is necessary to guarantee first 
(and when) that a measure with negative effects be enacted or if a   
39  On the constitutional principle of equality the studies of L. Paladin, 
Considerazioni sul principio costituzionale d'eguaglianza, are still indispensable, in 
Riv. Trim. Dir. Publ. 897 1962; Id., Eguaglianza (dir. sost.), in Enc. Dir., Vol. XIV, 
(1965) 519. By making the appropriate distinctions, this situation of unjustifiable 
inequality of treatment might somehow recall the situation that occurred in the 
second half of the 1990s, when redress for legitimate interests was foreseen only 
in the area of procurement (in application of the Community directive), while it 
was excluded in other sectors, on which subject cf. R. Caranta, Danni da lesione 
di interessi legittimi: la Corte costituzionale prende ancora tempo, in Foro it., I, 3485 
1998. 
40 For example, the Provincial Tax Commission of Campobasso stated in two 
recent judgments that a general obligation to activate the right to a hearing with 
respect to the adoption of measures that could negatively affect the rights and 
interests of taxpayers is always incumbent on the financial administration, 
overcoming the distinction between harmonised and non-harmonised taxes. 
Provincial Tax Commission of Campobasso, judgment no. 116 of 19 February 
2016 and judgment no. 1094 of 20 December 2016. 
41 For a comparative description of the different rights and duties of the tax 
authorities and taxpayers, cf. the useful OECD study Tax Administration 2015: 
Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies, 
(2015). The differences between the 27 countries of the Union with respect to 
tax-audit procedures and related taxpayers’ rights are highlighted in the book 
by L. Van Der Hel, Intra-Community Tax Audit (2011). 
42  For example, in addition to the disciplines mentioned above, the 
Abgabenordnung (German Tax Law) dedicates para. 91 to the hearing of the 
parties (Anhörung Beteiligter). 
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deferred protection of the same is sufficient, after the emanation of 
the act; what the function is connected to the participatory 
institution; what modalities are foreseen, in written or oral form or 
both; what additional rights are connected to it (access to 
documents, the right to present briefs and documents, the 
obligation for the administration to take into account what is 
expressed by the taxpayer); in which cases there are exceptions to 
the legal guarantee; what are the consequences for the violation of 
the right to be heard. 
As has been underlined, there are national regulations on 
tax proceedings that more fully protect the right to a hearing with 
respect to European sectoral disciplines. In these cases there is a 
reverse discrimination against the citizens of the Member States 
with more protective guarantees.  
Indeed, in these cases in tax proceedings governed solely by 
national law, the taxpayer enjoys greater safeguards than in tax 
proceedings in which EU law applies. 
Therefore, the procedural autonomy granted to the Member 
States can in this area generate an unequal treatment which 
appears difficult to justify. 
Furthermore, in the context of two actions for failure to 
comply proposed to the Court of Justice by the Commission for 
the delay of States in making available Community resources 
(concerning proceedings for the post-dated recovery of customs 
duties), the Member States had justified this delay precisely with 
the obligation to respect the rights to defence of the taxpayers. In 
both cases, the Court clarified that respect for the rights of defence 
relates solely to the relations between taxpayers and States, while 
it is not relevant for relations between Member States and the 
Communities; therefore, it cannot be invoked to justify a delay in 
the determination of the duties to be collected within the time 
limits laid down by European Community law43. 
  
43  Cf. para. 45 of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 June 2010, 
Commission vs. Italy, case C-423/08, “However, although the principle of 
observance of the rights of the defence applies in regard to relations between a 
debtor and a Member State, it cannot, as regards the relations between the 
Member States and the Communities, result in a Member State being entitled to 
disregard its obligation to enter into the accounts, within the time-limits laid 
down in the Community legislation, the Communities’ own resources 
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3.4. Failure to apply the right to a hearing in composite 
proceedings 
Also in the composite proceedings provided for by the 
European legislation on administrative cooperation in tax matters, 
the right to a hearing is highly restricted, as was shown in the 
Sabou case. 
In cross-border cooperation between tax administrations, 
the taxpayer’s right not only to participate, but also to be informed 
of the initiation of the procedure, is not foreseen. When a tax 
administration requests information from the Treasury of one or 
more foreign states – in order to correctly determine the taxes due 
from a taxpayer – it is not obliged to inform the citizen, even if the 
replies received will lead to the issuing of notices of assessment. 
In this case too, the circumstance of the application of EU 
law leads to discriminations that are difficult to justify. If Mr 
Sabou had made the deductible expenses in his own country (the 
Czech Republic), he would have had the right to participate in the 
proceedings, also intervening in the hearing of the witnesses, as 
required by the Czech tax laws. However, since the expenses 
allegedly incurred were made in other Member States, he not only 
did not take part in the procedure to verify the correctness of the 
costs, but was not even informed of the initiation of that 
procedure. 
The Court of Justice justifies these limitations on the right to 
a hearing by recalling the distinction between the investigation 
phase and the debate. However, at the end of the investigation 
phase (in which the right to be heard is not protected), the tax 
administration issued the assessment notice directly. Therefore, 
there can have been no debate. 
So too in composite proceedings, for nationals of states with 
statutory tax guarantees there is a difference in treatment that 
derives from the place where expenses are incurred. Whoever 
deducts costs incurred in their own country enjoys greater 
protection than those who had to incur expenses abroad as well.  
  
entitlement”, which recalls the previous judgment of 23 February 2006, 
Commission vs. Spain, case C-546/03, para. 33. 
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Since what applies is the law of the State where the request 
is made44, the taxpayer’s rights depend on the rules of the states in 
which they incurred the expenses. Therefore, in composite 
proceedings aimed at verifying the expenses incurred in different 
countries, the taxpayer could be asked to participate by some 
foreign tax administrations, and not receive any information from 
others. 
And that is not all. In countries with protective tax laws, 
non-residents (to whom the request for information will be 
received from the state of residence) will be more protected than 
residents (who will not receive a similar communication from the 
state from which the information is requested). 
Information from foreign tax administrations constitutes 
acts within the tax assessment procedure. In many countries it is 
not possible to challenge acts during proceedings. Thus, the 
taxpayer is forced to challenge the act from the foreign tax 
authority together with the final sanctioning act, at a time when 
the cooperation between the tax authorities has ended and it may 
be difficult to challenge the content of the document. The 
difficulty is greater, considering that there is no obligation in 
relation to the minimum content of the document to be 
transmitted: the foreign tax authority is not obliged to indicate 
how it has gathered the information, what procedure it followed, 
nor has it any obligation to provide motivation.  
Furthermore, in the administrative cooperation between tax 
authorities, only the relationship between taxpayer and the 
requesting state is considered, while the relationship between the 
taxpayer and the state to which the request is made is not 
considered. This appears to be not entirely justifiable, since in the 
various procedural stages the taxpayer is the holder of various 
interests to be protected against both states. In the initial phase of 
the request for information, the individual has an interest (in their 
relationship with the requesting state) to be informed and possibly 
to participate in the formulation of the investigations. In the 
subsequent phase of the inquiry, as well as in the drafting of the 
response, the individual has an interest (in their relationship with   
44  Article. 6, para. 3 of Directive 2011/16/EU states that “the requested 
authority shall follow the same procedures as it would when acting on its own 
initiative or at the request of another authority in its own Member State”. 
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the state to which the request is made) to participate in the 
investigations and contest the content of the response before an 
assessment notice can be based on this. 
The current European directive does not provide any right 
to be heard at any stage of the administrative cooperation. 
Furthermore, the information received from foreign tax 
authorities can also be used for purposes other than those for 
which they were requested45 and may be forwarded to a third 
Member State (the right to object to such sharing is recognised to 
the state to which the request is made, and not to the taxpayer46).  
Finally, a linguistic aspect should also be emphasised. In 
fact, if the right to receive a reply in one’s own language is 
protected in the relationship between citizens and European 
institutions, in the case of reciprocal assistance such a right is not 
guaranteed. Pursuant to Article 21, para. 4 of Directive 
2011/16/EU, answers can be provided “in any language agreed 
between the requested and requesting authority”, so they could 
also be written in a language that is not understood by the 
taxpayer. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
It is clear that even if there can be a general agreement on 
the abstract recognition of general principles, such as the due 
process of law, there are discrepancies in the sectoral discipline 
regarding the rights of the defence as well as in their concrete 
unfolding. 
The analysis carried out has made it possible to highlight 
various inconsistencies and differences in treatment in 
adjudication procedures in the tax field. In particular, the critical 
issues that emerge in a more significant way regard four profiles. 
Firstly, European regulations pertaining to the fiscal sector 
often do not provide for the right to be heard in proceedings, even 
when they are aimed at issuing damaging acts. 
Secondly, the case law of the Court of Justice and the Italian 
Court of Cassation is contradictory, as it reconstructs the right to 
be heard in a way that is not entirely consistent.   
45 Article 16, para. 2, Directive 2011/16/UE. 
46 Article  16, para. 3, Directive 2011/16/UE. 
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Thirdly, in some cases there is a reverse discrimination in 
national proceedings implementing EU law. In fact, there are 
national regulations on tax proceedings that provide for higher 
guarantees with respect to European sectoral disciplines. In these 
cases in tax proceedings governed solely by national law, the 
taxpayer enjoys greater safeguards than in tax proceedings in 
which EU law applies.  
Finally, in the composite proceedings provided for by the 
European legislation on administrative cooperation in tax matters, 
the right to a hearing is not foreseen. The current European 
directive does not provide any right to be heard at any stage of the 
administrative cooperation. 
 
